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Abstract 
I define traceability by its reliability that is the probability by which the identity of raw 
material suppliers (agents) is preserved linked with food. I consider a food processor 
(principal) that buys from many homogeneous agents. The food processor chooses the level 
of food safety effort, the reliability of traceability and the value of contingent payments so to 
entice agents to exert the chosen level of food safety effort, minimizing costs. The focus is on 
cases in which food safety crises can be caused only by misspecification of raw material. I 
show that very reliable traceability can be a substitute for high intensive contingent payments 
schemes and vice-versa, indicating that traceability is not an unequivocal signal for safer 
food. I also show that government regulation based on the imposition of traceability’s 
reliability may not lead to safer food but increased pecuniary penalties due to food safety 
failure can induce safer food. 
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Resumo 
Define-se rastreabilidade com base em sua confiabilidade que é a probabilidade de que a 
identidade dos fornecedores de matérias-primas (agentes) seja preservada atrelada ao produto 
final. Considera-se o caso de um processador de alimentos (principal) que compra de vários 
fornecedores (agentes) homogêneos. O principal escolhe o nível de esforço a ser induzido, a 
confiabilidade do seu sistema de rastreabilidade e os valores dos pagamentos contingentes, de 
modo a induzir os agentes a exercerem o nível de esforço escolhido, minimizando custos. O 
foco é sobre casos em que crises de segurança do alimento são causadas apenas por 
problemas na matéria-prima utilizada. Mostra-se que sistemas de rastreabilidade de elevada 
confiabilidade podem substituir esquemas de pagamentos contingentes intensivos e vice-
versa, indicando que a confiabilidade de um sistema de rastreabilidade não é um sinal 
inequívoco de maior segurança do alimento. Mostra-se ainda que a regulação governamental 
via a imposição de um nível pré-determinado de confiabilidade dos sistemas de 
rastreabilidade pode ser inócua e que a imposição de multas mais severas em caso de crises 
de segurança do alimento podem aumentar a segurança do alimento. 
Palavras-chave: Perigo Moral, Preservação da Identidade, Rastreabilidade, Segurança do 
Alimento. 
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Introduction 
There are many examples of widely publicized episodes of food borne diseases resulting in 
food safety crises. Cases of botulism (Clostridium botulinum) due to the ingestion of canned 
hearth-of-palms were reported between years 1997 and 1999 in Brazil. In 2002, nearly 19 
million pounds of ground beef possibly contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 and 27.4 million 
pounds of chicken and turkey products that might be contaminated with Listeria 
monocytogenes were recalled (Teratanavat and Hooker 2004). Other recent examples of food 
safety crises are the first case of an animal testing positive for Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States and in Canada in 2003. Also, poultry and dairy 
products were recently found contaminated with dioxin in European countries and dangerous 
to the health levels of hormones and antibiotics in meat have been noticed in many places of 
the world.  
High profile food safety crises have created a desire to identify strategies to improve 
quality-control systems in world food supply chain. In this context, traceability has been 
proposed as a potential instrument for safer food. Traceability has been also adopted to 
improve supply chain management and animal health, to combat bio-terrorism, to comply 
with international trade standards, and to certify credence
2 attributes (Golan et al. 2004). This 
article focuses on the relation between traceability and food safety.  
The International Organization for Standardization (2000) states that traceability 
systems create the ability to retrieve the history and location of a product through a registered 
identity. Starbird and Amonor-Boadu (2006) point out that a traceability system is composed 
of a series of procedures by which the identification, preparation, collection, storage, and 
verification of data are performed. This includes implementing computer systems and 
databases, identification technologies such as bar codes or tags, and improved supply chain 
management protocols. Thus, traceability just accumulates information about product 
attributes, including safety and origin, as the product moves through the supply chain.  
Unlike Pathogen Reduction
3 (PR) and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
4 
(HACCP), traceability does not aim at direct interventions in procedures and processes in the 
production so to improve safety and quality controls already in place. Therefore, traceability 
adoption does not seem by itself to imply safer food.  
Food supply chains are traditionally composed of independent firms where product 
moves from a firm to the next through open market transactions wherein qualities, quantities 
and prices are established through observation and negotiation. In general, downstream firms 
do not observe food safety and food quality efforts exerted by upstream firms and the direct 
monitoring of upstream production processes is often prohibitively expensive. Moreover, 
downstream firms cannot directly observe the safety of upstream firms’ product because food 
safety is a credence attribute (Golan et al. 2004). Thus, quality and safety problems originated 
at farm level often manifest themselves in downstream stages of production at which point 
the farmer identity was already lost.  
Once traceability allows for tracing inputs used in the production of food back to their 
origin at various levels in the supply chain, it may reduce anonymity. In fact, traceability can 
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strengthen liability incentives (Hobbs 2004) by providing useful information in accessing ex 
post legal responsibility by those involved in the food production chain (Tonsor and 
Schroeder 2004). This is exactly the primary concern of most opponents of mandatory 
introduction of traceability (e.g. national animal identification systems) (Souza-Monteiro and 
Caswell 2004). Notice that neither of these authors provide explicit model of the relationship 
between traceability and incentives. But Pouliot and Sumner (2008) and Starbird and 
Amonor-Boadu (2006; 2007) studies the effect of traceability on strength liability along 
supply chains. 
There are many studies addressing the issue of how to increase producers’ efforts so 
to improve product quality and safety via incentives. Dubois and Vukina (2004), Starbird 
(2005), and King, Backus and Gaag (2007) use principal-agent models to evaluate the 
impacts of incentives offered by a principal on the effort of agents.  King, Backus and Gage 
further show that reputation can be an added incentive to induce performance under a 
contract.   In these previous studies, the principal knows the agent’s identity at the time 
an event influenced by the agent’ effort is observed that is certainly the case when raw 
material is tested on delivery.  However, there are many cases in which the product defect 
caused by the agent can be discovered only after processing has begun.  By this time the 
identity of the raw material supplier is likely to have been separated from the processed 
product.  The model in this article formalizes this idea and unlike Pouliot and Sumner (2008) 
and Starbird and Amonor-Boadu (2006; 2007), considers and explicitly shows how 
traceability can be endogenously set by private firms. The model developed in this article 
follows close the framework used by Resende-Filho and Buhr (2008) for studying injection-
site lesion control in beef, but differs from them by looking at the more general issue of food 
safety.  
This article studies traceability under the perspective that although it does not directly 
act on food safety, it can do so indirectly. This is because traceability makes it possible to 
identify the source of food safety problems with some chance of success, reducing 
anonymity. Hence, traceability may mitigate suboptimal results due to asymmetric 
information amongst buyers and suppliers by allowing for the use of explicit and implicit 
incentives along food supply chains. Based on this premise, I pursue three objectives in this 
article. First, I aim at modeling and showing that voluntary use of traceability allows for the 
creation of incentives mechanisms that induce higher food safety efforts by raw material 
suppliers, leading to safer food. Second, I want to show that the adoption of traceability may 
not be an unequivocal signal of safer food. Third, I want to investigate how exogenously 




Although food safety crises may have many different origins, this article focuses only on 
problems originated at farm level. In other words, the focus is on cases in which food 
processor’s effort has no effect on the safety of the final product but suppliers’ effort has. 
Examples of problems originated only at farm level include chemical residues in food (e.g. 
dioxin, antibiotics, hormones and pesticides residues), physical residues in food (e.g. due to 
foreign objects such as broken syringe needles from health treatments) and feeding of 
restricted ingredients (e.g., animal by-products in the case of BSE).  
Consider that food safety is a binary random variable, ω. Food is safe to human 
consumption or, equivalently, the raw material does not cause food to be unsafe with 
probability F. Moreover, F depends only on supplier’s effort, F=F(a), such that: 
 
Assumption 1.  '(.) 0, "(.) 0 FF >< , where F(a) is a cumulative density function.    4
 
Assumption 1 assures that food safety probability increases in effort but at decreasing 
rates (see Tirole 1988, p.54). 




7. Following them, this article studies traceability systems that 
just store information about the identity of the raw material supplier (traceability’s breadth) 
and keep this information from the delivery of the raw material up to the consumption of the 
food product (traceability’s depth). Like any information system, a traceability system fails 
with some frequency as a consequence of hardware and software failures and human 
mistakes. Therefore, when food is unsafe and traceability works the source of problem is 
automatically pinpointed because food can be unsafe in the model only due to problems 
caused by raw material misspecification. Furthermore, it is assumed that there are no false 
positives. The consequence of this is that when food is unsafe, and traceability works 
properly the precision of a traceability system, as defined by Golan et al. (2004), is 100% and 
zero if traceability fails.   
The reliability of a traceability system follows a binary random variable, φ such that 
the frequency by which the system works properly is s and the probability by which it fails is 
(1-s). Notice that a traceability system is fully characterized by its reliability, s.  
Given the above context, the principal and each agent play a one-shot, two-stage 
sequential game that runs as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Timing of the principal-agent game with traceability 
 
According to figure 1, the principal is the first mover, setting and offering to agents a 
contract composed of a contingent payment scheme and the traceability system’s reliability. 
In sequence, homogeneous agents exert food safety efforts as their best response to the 
contract offered by the principal. Finally, payments are made to agents on the basis of 
observed states of nature. 
A failure of the traceability system means that suppliers’ identity was lost during food 
processing. In such contingency, it is impossible to reward or punish agents based on if food 
is found safe or unsafe. Thus, I0 denotes the income transfer to agents when traceability fails 
regardless of the safety of food (contingency 0). On the other hand, when the traceability 
system works properly, I1 is the payment to agents if food is safe (contingency 1), and I2 
                                                 
5 Breadth is the amount of information recorded by the system (Golan et al. 2004). 
6 Depth defines how far forward and backward in the supply chain traceability extends 
(Golan et al. 2004). 
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otherwise (contingency 2). Summing up, Im is the payment per raw material lot that is 
contingent on m∈M, with M={0, 1, and 2}. For convenience, table 1 summarizes 
probabilities and contingencies in the model. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Events, their Probabilities and Contingent Payments in the Model 
Asymmetric Information with Traceability Setting Symmetric 
Information 
Setting  Traceability Works  Traceability Fails  Event 
Probability Probability Payment Probability Payment




(1-s)F(a) I 0 
Raw material causes 






(1-s)(1-F(a))  I0 
 
The Agent’s Problem 
 
Each raw material supplier’s preferences are represented by a utility function whose 
arguments are contingent transfers (Im) and food safety effort (a). Following Holmström 
(1979), Tirole (1988), Goodhue (2000), and Starbird (2005), I assume additive separability 
between income utility and disutility of effort so that an agent’s utility function U: ℜ
2→ ℜ is:   
 
U(Im, a)=u(Im)-c(a)                                            (1) 
 
where U(.) is a von Neuman Morgenstern utility function, u(.) is a Bernoulli utility function 
as defined by Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1996,  p. 184), and c(.) is a cost function for 
effort.   
 
Assumption 2. u′(.)>0, u″(.)≤0, c′(.)>0, and c″(.)>0. 
 
Being an agent the second mover in the game, he/she takes as given the contract (s, I0, 
I1, I 2) previously established by the principal and chooses the level of food safety effort so to 
maximize his/her expected utility as given by problem (2). 
 
0 max
a≥  (1-s)u(I0)+sF(a)u(I1)+s(1-F(a))u(I2)-c(a)                                              (2) 
 
The first order necessary condition for problem (2) so to attain a maximum at the 
interior point, a*, is:  
 
sF′(a*)(u(I1)-u(I2))-c′(a*)=0                                 (3) 
 
Notice from (3) that when s is zero an agent’s best response is given as the solution 
for c'(a*)=0. Being c(a) strictly convex  by assumption 2, c'(a*)=0 implies that the lowest 
level of food safety effort will be exert when traceability is not in place (s=0). Obviously, the 
lowest level of food safety effort must not imply that the probability of food being safe is 
zero (F(a)=0), otherwise the level of effort exerted by the population of homogeneous agents 
would be fully revealed and the principal could pay based on it. In other words, there must be 
some safe food in the market so to agents remain anonymous even if no traceability exists. I   6
assume that the lowest level of effort is the one already exerted in the market wherein no 
traceability system is adopted by food processors.  
Based on (3) the following result is formalized. 
 
Result 1. It is necessary that a traceability is in place (s must be strictly positive) so to 
induce food safety efforts higher than the lowest level of effort already exerted when no 
traceability system is adopted.  
 
The second-order sufficient condition for problem (2) so to attain a maximum at the 
interior point, a*, is:  
sF″(a*)(u(I1)-u(I2))-c″(a*)<0                         
(4) 
The characteristics of the principal-agent with traceability problem that are presented 
later in this article will guarantee that (u(I1)- u(I2))>0. Regarding this point, see discussion 
about equation (15). Notice that (u(I1)- u(I2))>0 implies, by assumption 2, that (I1-I2)>0. To 
sum up, a traceability system in place (s>0) together with F″(a)<0 and c″(a)>0  (assumptions 
1 and 2) are sufficient for the second-order sufficient condition (4) to be fulfilled.  
Rearranging the first-order condition (3) results in: 
 
sF′(a*)(u(I1)-u(I2))=c′(a*)                                (5) 
 
Notice that the left hand side of (5) gives the marginal expected utility of higher food 
safety effort. The marginal benefit of higher effort stems from the reduction of the probability 
of food safety crises occurring, which increases the chance of an agent improve her/his 
welfare by (u(I1)-u(I2))>0. On the other hand, the right hand side of (5) represents the 
marginal disutility of higher food safety effort for an agent. Thus, the optimal level of effort, 
a*, is attained when the marginal benefit and the marginal disutility of food safety effort 
equals.  
 
Traceability, Contingent Payments and Food Safety 
 
To investigate the relationship between the pieces of the contract and food safety it suffices to 
look at the problem faced by raw material suppliers. In this way, let the level of effort that 
maximizes problem (3) be a continuously differentiable function of traceability system’s 
reliability and  payments in contingencies 0, 1 and 2, such that a*=a*(s, I0, I1, I2). Given this, 
I investigate in following how the optimal level of an agent’s effort alter with changes in the 
arguments of a*(.). 
First, to investigate the effect on a* of increased reliability of traceability, I take the 
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                             (6) 
 
The denominator of (6) is strictly negative from equation (4), (u(I1)-u(I2)) is strictly 
positive (see discussion about equation (15)), and F′(a) is positive from assumption 1, which 
implies the following result: 









 Increased reliability of traceability induces higher food safety efforts by 
raw material suppliers, everything else remaining constant. 
To investigate the effect on a* of higher payments in the contingency in which   
traceability works properly and no food safety crisis is observed (contingency 1), I take the 
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  Adding the fact that  '(.) 0 u > (by assumption 2) to the explanation of result 2 implies 











 Higher payment when traceability works properly and no food safety 
crisis occurs induces more food safety effort by raw material suppliers, everything else 
remaining constant. 
  Finally, to investigate the effect of increasing payment in the contingency in which 
the traceability system works properly and a food safety crisis occurs, I take the derivative of 
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 Higher payment when the traceability system works properly and food 
safety crisis occurs induces less food safety effort by suppliers, everything else remaining 
constant. 
 
  Notice that the role played by payment I0 is just to make (1-s)u(I0)+sF(a*)u(I1)+s(1-
F(a*))u(I2)-d(a*)≥U, where U denotes the reservation utility or the lowest expected utility 
level a contract must guarantee so to get an agent to accept the contract. 
  Based on results 1, 2, 3 and 4 the following conclusions can be obtained: (i) The 
implementation of a traceability system is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
inducing higher food safety effort than the effort exerted by agents when traceability is not in 
place. Indeed, traceability must be used jointly with contingent payments so to be sufficient 
for safer food; (ii) Assuming both conditions (u(I1)-u(I2))>0 and s>0 hold it is also true that 
increased  intensity of incentive, (I1-I2), can substitute s in inducing a given level of food 
safety effort. Thus, one should not infer the level of food safety effort and consequently food 
safety by separately looking at s, I1 and I2. For example, it is possible that an unreliable 
traceability system coupled with a high intensive incentive will induce the same level of food 
safety effort as a high reliable traceability system combined with a low intensive incentive. 
  It should be noticed though that the level of effort to be enticed is ultimately a   8
decision variable of the food processor as is discussed later in the article. Thus, it is possible 
that low levels of food safety can coexist with traceability and contingent payments in place. 
 
The Principal-Agent Framework 
 
This section aims at answering the following questions: How does the cost of food safety 
crisis (re) affect the level of food safety efforts, and therefore food safety? And how can 
traceability regulation affect food safety?  To answer these questions I will first formalize the 
settings with symmetric information and asymmetric information with traceability using 
principal-agent models as follows.  
The Symmetric Information Setting 
The symmetric information or first-best setting is characterized by agents’ food safety effort 
being freely observed by the principal. In such a context the principal is able to set payments 
contingent on the level of exerted food safety effort, which makes the contract a pair (I, a). 
Under the assumption that the profit maximization problem of the food processor can be 
simplified so to minimize the cost incurred with the payment of raw material suppliers plus 
expenses with food safety crises, the principal sets a contract by solving problem (9). 
, min
aI I+(1-F(a))re                                        (9a) 
Subject to:  
u(I)-c(a) ≥ U                                (9b) 
 
where re is the external cost of a food safety crisis which includes the direct cost of liability, 
product recalls, allowances, court or market-imposed penalties and fines levied due to safety 
failures. 
  Notice that the objective function (9a) is strictly increasing in the payment of agents, 
which implies that the participation constraint (9b) binds at a solution of problem (9). Using 
this fact, the first-best payment is given by: 
 
IFB=v(U +c(aFB))                              (10) 
 
where v(.) is the inverse function of the Bernoulli utility function, u(.). Notice that u(IFB)≡(U 
+c(aFB). 
  Plugging (10) into (9a) and solving for the first-best level of food safety effort (aFB) 
gives the following first order necessary condition for problem (9): 
 
(( ) )











                           (11) 
 
  Condition (11) shows that the first-best level of effort (aFB) is a function of re, 
aFB=aFB(re). Notice that if the agent is risk neutral, condition (11) becomes:  
 
c′(aFB)-reF′( aFB)=0.                                                                                                              (11′) 
 
  To see the effect of higher costs of food safety crisis, for example as a consequence of 
increased fines levied due to safety failures, I take the derivative of equation (11) with respect 
to re obtaining: 
   9
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From equation (12) and based on the assumptions that v′ (.)>0, v″(.)≥0, 









>0. Under symmetric information, increased external cost of food safety 
crises induces the principal to contract higher level of effort that leads to safer food, 
everything else remaining constant. 
 
Result 5 obviously relies on the assumption that an interior solution for problem (9) 
will still hold even after increasing fines for safety failures. In fact, if the cost of food safety 
crisis increases too much it can become the principal’s best choice not to produce 
(inactivation) or even to leave definitively the industry. 
The Asymmetric Information with Traceability Setting 
 
Consider that a food processor’s profit maximization problem can be simplified so to 
minimize the expected cost incurred with the payment of raw material suppliers, with the 
operation of a traceability system and with damages caused by food safety crisis. Given this, 
the principal should choose the second-best level of food safety efforts (aSB) and the contract 
(s, I0, I1, I 2) such that it will be each agent’s best interest to accept the contract and to exert 
aSB. The principal-agent with traceability setting is formalized as problem (13). 
012 ,( 0 , 1 ] ,, , min
as I I I ∈ (1-s)I0+sF(a)I1+s(1-F(a))I2+(1-F(a))re+g(s)                       (13a) 
Such that: 
(1-s)u(I0)+sF(a)u(I1)+s(1-F(a))u(I2)-c(a) ≥ U                      (13b) 
12 '( )( ( ) ( )) '( ) 0 sF a u I u I c a −− =  (Equation (3))                        (13c) 
where g(.) denotes the cost of tracing a lot of raw material back to its suppliers as a function 
of s. 
 
 Assumption  3.  g(.) is a strictly increasing function (g′(.)>0), continuously 
differentiable and convex (g″(.)>0) in its entire domain, s∈[0,1].  
 
  Assumption 3 is necessary for the objective function (13a) to be strictly convex so 
that problem (13) is a convex programming problem. Therefore, a solution for (13) will be a 
global minimum. 
  The objective function (13a) is set assuming that one lot of raw material produces one 
lot of food product so that (13a) is defined as the sum of five terms as follows:  The first term 
denotes the expected payment per lot of food when traceability fails. The second term gives 
the expected payment per lot food when food is safe and traceability works properly. The 
third term is the expected payments per lot of food when a food safety crisis occurs and 
traceability works. The fourth term gives the expected cost of food safety crises. Finally, the 
last term is the cost of using a traceability system of reliability s.  
  The participation constraint (13b) assures that the contract will be accepted by agents, 
and the incentive compatibility constraint (13c) guarantees that it will be an agent’s best 
interest to exert the food safety effort chosen by the principal.    10
  Constraint (13b) binds at a solution because the higher is the expected utility assured 
to agents by the contract; the more expensive the incentive scheme will be to the principal. 
Thus, a contract should just guarantee the reservation utility so to minimize costs for the 
principal. Given this, I manipulate equations (13b) and (13c) so to put u(I1) and u(I2) as 
functions of a, s and I0 as given by equations (16) and (17). In doing so, I take the following 
steps.  




() ( 1 () )( ) ( 1 )( )
()
()
Uc a s F a u I s u I
uI
sF a
+− − − −
=                           (14) 
 











                              (15) 







 is greater than zero in equation (15) proves that u(I1) will 
be set greater than u(I2). Moreover, because u'(.)>0 by Assumption 2, it is also true that I1 will 
be set greater than I2. In other words, any contract will be set so to better pay agents in the 
contingence that is preferred by the principal. 




() () ( 1 )( ) () ()
(( , ,) )
()
FaU c a s u I ca F a
uI asI
sF a
′′ +− − −
=
′
                     (16) 
 
  Finally, plugging (16) into (15) gives: 
 
( ) ( ) 0
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FaU c a s u I ca F a
uI asI
sF a
′′ +− − + −
=
′
                  (17) 
 
  Using the inverse Bernoulli utility function, it is possible to define the following two 
identities:  I1(a,  s,  I0)≡v(u(I1(a,  s,  I0))) and I1(a,  s,  I0)≡v(u(I1(a,  s,  I0))). Plugging these 
identities into (13a) makes it possible to reset the principal’s problem as an unconstrained one 
in which I0, s and a are the decision variables, as shown in problem (18).  
 
0 ,( 0 , 1 ] , min
as I ∈ (1-s)I0+sF(a)I1(a,s,I0)+s(1-F(a))I2(a,s,I0)+(1-F(a))re+g(s)                                      (18) 
 
  First-order conditions for an interior solution of problem (18) are presented as 
follows. 






'( ) (.) (.) ( ) (1 ( )) '( ) 0 e
II
sF a I I s F a F a r F a
aa
∂∂ ⎛⎞ −+ + − − = ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
                (19) 
 
First-order condition with respect to the reliability of traceability is: 
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                             (21) 
 
  It is not possible to find conclusive comparative statics results for the model when 
agents are risk averse, thus problem (18) is used to study the particular case in which agents 
are risk neutral. In other words, I set the Bernoulli utility function as u(Im)=Im. In so doing, I 
first derive some intermediate results so to make it possible to manipulate equations (19), 
(20) and (21) in a reasonable way. Using equations (16) and (17) it is possible to show that: 
 
() () ()























                         (23). 
 
























                          (23′)  
 
 Plugging  (22′) in the first-order condition (19) results in: 
 
( ) 12 '( ) '( ) 0 e sF a I I r F a −− =                           (19′)  
 
  Plugging the risk neutral agent’s best response  12 () ( ) () sFaI I ca ′ ′ − = (see equation 
(5)) into (19′) and assuming that s>0, makes condition (19) equal:   
 
'( ) '( ) 0 e ca Fa r −=                              (19″) 
 
  Notice that (19″) is equal to the first-order condition of the first-best problem (11′) 
that implies result 6.  
 
Result 6.  When agents are risk neutral, the first-best and second-best levels of food safety 
effort equal, provided that a traceability system is in place (s>0).  
 
  Thus, form Result 6 it is possible to see that what differs between the symmetric and 
asymmetric information settings is just the need for using a traceability system in the later. 
  It is possible to show that the first-order conditions (20) for the case wherein agents 
are risk neutral becomes:   12
 
'( ) 0 gs=                                 (24) 
 
 Once ( ) g s  is strictly convex by assumption 3, condition (24) implies result 7. 
 
Result 7.  If agents are risk neutral, the principal chooses the lowest level of traceability so to 
make it possible to use a contingent payment scheme.  
 
  Notice that the lowest level of traceability must be greater than zero otherwise no 
incentive scheme can be created. The fact is that when agents are risk neutral, increased 
variability of contingent payment does not require higher risk-premiums payment to agents so 
to get them to participate in the contract. In other words, when agents are risk neutral there is 
no cost of using high variability contingent payments schemes, but the greater the reliability 
of a traceability system is the more costly will be for the principal to induce the first-best 
food safety effort. 
  Results 6 and 7 imply that even a traceability system of low reliability can induce 
first-best level of food safety effort, confirming that low reliability of traceability is not 
synonymous of low food safety. In fact, when agents are risk averse, it is cheaper to 
substitute reliability of traceability by more intensive incentive payments. This is because 
more reliable traceability costs more by assumption, whereas higher intensive incentive 
payments do not cost more to the principal because risk neutral agents do not require risk 
premium for incurring more risk.   
  Finally, first-order condition (21) is automatically fulfilled when agents are risk 
neutral. To see this, by plugging (23′) into the left hand side of (21) gives 
()
1
(1 ) 1 ss s
s
⎛⎞ −+ − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 that is zero provided that s>0. The consequence of this is result 8. 
 
Result 8.  I0 can assume any value at a solution for problem (18) when agents are risk neutral. 
 
Food Safety Regulation 
 
Having derived and studied the first-order conditions of problem (18) for the case wherein 
agents are risk neutral; it is possible now to finally study food safety regulation by 
government. In following, I investigate first the effect of increased fines levied due to safety 
failures on food safety. Second, I investigate the effect of the imposition of traceability 
standards based on its reliability on food safety. 
  Government can increase fines levied due to safety failures as a policy to improve 
food safety. The effect of this type of policy on food safety is investigated as an increase in re. 
From results 7 and 8 one sees that only the optimal food safety level of effort will depend on 
re when agents are risk neutral.  The consequence of this is that  11 0 ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ee e II a r I r s r = and 
22 0 (() , () ,() ) ee e II a r I r s r =  can be simplified when agents are risk neutral to 
11 (() ) e II a r = and 22 (() ) e II a r = . Using these simplifications in taking the derivative of 










sI I rF a s Fa Fa
ra a
∂ ⎛∂ ∂ ⎞ ⎛⎞ −− + − − = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
.  
By plugging  ( ) 12 0 e sI I r −− = , obtained from condition (19′), into this gives result 9.  
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Result 9.
1








− ∂ ∂∂ ⎛⎞ =− > ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
. Food safety regulation based on increased fines 
due to food safety failures improves second-best food safety efforts, leading to food safety 
when agents are risk neutral.  
 
  In terms of food safety regulation, government can impose traceability standards that 
means in the context of this article’s model the same as the imposition of a given level of 
traceability’s reliability, s. Notice that when agents are risk neutral, from results 7 and 8, only 
the optimal food safety level of effort will depend on s.  The consequence of this is that 
11 0 (() , () ,) II a s I s s = and  22 0 (() , () ,) II a s I s s =  become  11 (() ,) II a s s = and 22 (() ,) II a s s = . 





12 1 1 2 2
12
22
1 12 1 2
12
'( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
"( ) 2 '( ) ( ) (1 ( )) e
II I I I I
Fa I I s F a s F a s
s sa a s a a s a
s II I I
sF a I I sr s Fa F a F a
a a aa aa
−
⎛⎞⎛⎞ ⎛∂ ∂ ⎞ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ −+ − + + + − + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠⎝⎠ =−
∂ ⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ −− + − + + − ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
  (25) 
  Using the fact that  () () 12
1
2 Fa ca II
s
aa ss




1 1 1 I I
s
as a
∂ ∂ − =−
∂ ∂∂











11 22 () ( 1 () ) 0
II II
Fa s Fa s
aa s aa s
⎛⎞⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂∂
+ +− + = ⎜⎟⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠⎝⎠
. Plugging this 
result into (25) gives: 
 





1 12 1 2
12
'( ) '( ) '( )
"( ) 2 '( ) ( ) (1 ( )) e
Fa I I s sFa ca a
s II I I
s F a I I sr s F a Fa Fa





∂ ⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ −− + − + + − ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠




12 () () II s c a F a
−− ′′ −= and
22
12 1 2 () ( 1 () )
II I I
Fa Fa
aa a a a a
∂∂ ∂ ∂
−= + −
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'( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) '( )
"( ) (2 '( ) 1) e
Fasca Fa sFa ca a
s II
sF a sI I r Fa
aa
−− − − ′′− ∂
=−
∂ ⎛∂ ∂ ⎞ ⎛⎞ −−+ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
                  (25″) 
 











∂ ∂ ∂∂ ⎛⎞ +− ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
          ( 2 5 ″′) 
 
  Result 10 is obtained on the basis of equation (26″′) as follows. 
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. An exogenous imposition of traceability standards has no effect on 
second-best food safety efforts when agents are risk averse. 
 
  Result 10 implies that to base food safety regulation on imposing a certain type of 




Food safety crises have shown to be frequent. As a reaction to this, the adoption of 
traceability has been proposed as a means of increasing food safety. However, traceability 
just accumulates information about the product and processes as the product moves through 
its supply chain. Therefore, traceability adoption does not imply by itself safer food. Despite 
this, this article shows that traceability can be an effective means of improving food safety 
because it reduces anonymity in food supply chains and thus makes it possible to use 
incentives via contingent payment schemes. In doing so, I use a principal-agent model in 
which food safety can be caused only by the misspecification of raw materials and 
traceability denotes the probability of keeping the identities of homogeneous raw material 
suppliers linked with final food products. Thus, traceability allows for using payments that 
are contingent on whether food is or is not safe for consumption. In this moral hazard context, 
the food processor (principal) sets a contract based on the reliability of traceability and 
contingent payments so to entice agents to exert the food safety effort chosen by him/her.   
I subdivide the principal-agent problem by first studying the problem faced by an 
individual raw material supplier, deriving his/her best response function. Doing comparative 
statics of his/her best response showed that high intensive payment incentives can substitute 
more reliable traceability and vice-versa. This result indicates that one should not infer food 
safety just on the basis of the reliability of a traceability system. Despite this, a traceability 
system must be in place so to make incentives via contingent payment feasible. In other 
words, it is a necessary condition for safer food that the reliability of traceability is greater 
than zero but the reliability of traceability system is not an unequivocal signal of food safety.  
   The complete principal-agent model with traceability is set and used to study the 
ultimate level of food safety. This is because the level of food safety effort to be induced on 
agents is a food processor’s decision variable. I simplify the model by assuming agents are 
risk neutral and found that first-best and second-best food safety levels of effort equal in this 
particular case. Moreover, I showed that when agents are risk neutral neither the intensity of 
the contingent payment scheme nor the reliability of traceability affect the food safety effort 
level chosen by the principal. This result has a direct implication for food safety regulation by 
government since it is possible that the imposition of a certain level of traceability’s 
reliability can have no effect on food safety. Finally, this article shows that increased 
penalties for food safety crises can induce higher food safety efforts that ultimately will imply 
safer food.  
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